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Findings from cross-cultural theory-of-mind studies highlight potential measurement effects and both general (e.g., East-West)
and specific (e.g., pedagogical experiences) cultural contrasts. We compared theory-of-mind scores for children fromUK and Italy
(two Western countries that differ in age of school entry) and Japan (a Far-Eastern country in which children, like their Italian
counterparts, start school later than British children). Confirmatory factor analysis was applied to data from 268 age-gender- and
verbal ability-matched 5- to 6-year olds. Key findings were that (i) all 8 indicators loaded onto a single latent factor; and (ii) this
latent factor explained significant variance in each group, with just one indicator showing differential item functioning. Supporting
the importance of pedagogical experiences, British children outperformed both their Italian and Japanese counterparts.
1. Introduction
Individual differences in the rate at which children acquire
a theory of mind appear important for children’s success
at school [1, 2] and for relationships with friends (e.g., [3])
and peers [4, 5]. However, the lion’s share of research on
individual differences in children’s understanding of mind
has focused on the origins of individual differences. As
documented in recent reviews (e.g., [6, 7]) much of this
research has concerned structural family factors, such as
number of siblings [8] or overall family size [9], or more
qualitative family factors, such as frequency of maternal talk
about mental states (e.g., [10–12]) or cooperative interactions
with siblings [13, 14].
Beyond the family, other studies have shown that vari-
ation in conversations about mental states with friends [15]
and children’s social acceptance by their peer group [4] also
predict individual differences in children’s performance on
tests of theory of mind. Alongside this research on extrafa-
milial social influences is a marked expansion in the scope of
theory-of-mind research, such that accounts that emphasize
universality (e.g., [16, 17]) have been challenged on several
fronts. Specifically, meta-analytic findings indicate that Asian
children lag significantly behind American and British chil-
dren on false-belief tasks [18]. In addition, children from
different cultures appear to vary not only in the rate but also
in the order in which they achieve distinct milestones within
theory of mind. For example, while children from individ-
ualistic cultures typically acquire an understanding of the
subjective nature of belief before they appreciate constraints
on knowledge, children from collectivistic cultures, such as
China or Iran, typically understand knowledge before they
understand belief [19, 20].
Theoretically, findings from cross-cultural studies pro-
vide not only a rigorous test of the generalizability of
theories that emerge from one particular culture but also
a means of testing commonly held assumptions regarding
the structure of children’s theories of mind. In particular, do
distinct measures tap into the same latent ability even when
administered in different languages to children fromdifferent
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cultures? Existing work on East-West differences in children’s
understanding of mind is largely restricted to comparisons
of first-order false-belief understanding in children from
China and USA (e.g., [18, 21]), with converging support from
studies that examine false-belief understanding in children
from other Confucian countries, including Korea [22, 23]
and Japan [24, 25]. Collectively, these findings lead to the
prediction that children from collectivist Confucian cultures
(such as China, Korea, and Japan) are likely to lag behind
children from individualisticWestern cultures in their under-
standing of subjective mental states [22, 26]. Challenging this
simple East-West contrast, however, are findings that suggest
significant variation within each of these cultural settings.
First,meta-analytic data reveal that children fromHongKong
lag behind their peers inmainlandChina [18], despite leading
much more westernized lives. One possible explanation for
this contrast hinges on differences in children’s linguistic
environments: for economic reasons, a very large proportion
of children inHong Kong are cared for by adults from outside
the family who may share their bedroom but typically do
not speak Cantonese (e.g., [27]). Second, Lecce et al. [2]
reported a similarly surprising contrast between twoWestern
groups: children in UK and Italy (matched for age, gender,
verbal ability, and maternal education). In discussing this
contrast, these authors noted that Italian children begin
formal schooling at age 6, at least a year later than their
British counterparts. This raises the possibility that entry to
school is at least as important as the contact with close kin
that is such a feature of Mediterranean life [9]. Specifically,
formal schooling offers both increased contact with peers and
exposure to pedagogical situations that encourage reflective
self-awareness and so may be particularly important to
theory-of-mind development [28].
In the current study, we built on existing collaborative
relations to recruit samples in UK, Italy, and Japan. Existing
research into the East-West contrast in theory of mind
has been almost exclusively focused on the performance of
3- to 5-year olds on standard first-order false-belief tasks. To
test the developmental and methodological generalizability
of existing findings, we selected school-aged children (5- to
6-year-olds) and included a variety of theory-of-mind tasks
in our test battery. To our knowledge, the current study is
the first cross-cultural to include not only standard first-
order false-belief tasks but also tasks that tap into children’s
later-emerging abilities to infer emotion from false belief
[29] and to understandmistaken beliefs about others’ beliefs,
that is, second-order false-beliefs [30]. A further limitation
of previous cross-cultural studies is that these have not
typically assessed participants’ verbal ability (e.g., [16, 17]) or
matched samples on both age and verbal ability (e.g., [11]).
Given that there is a widely reported robust relation between
verbal ability and false-belief understanding (e.g., [31]), this
omission is surprising. In the current study we therefore
oversampled within each country to ensure that it would be
possible to match groups for age, gender, and verbal ability.
Thus, by administering a wide variety of theory-of-mind
tasks to carefully matched groups of school-aged children,
we aimed both to extend the conceptual and developmental
scope of existing cross-cultural research and to improve
the methodological rigour of this research. In particular,
adopting a battery approach allowed us to apply statistical
methods to test the extent towhich cultural differences simply
reflect contrasts in the measurement properties of tasks
used in different languages with different cultural groups.
Group differences can arise in cross-cultural research for
a number of reasons that are unrelated to differences in
underlying abilities; these include differing definitions and
meanings of a concept, inappropriate translations, and dif-
fering response styles, reflecting differences in social norms
[32, 33]. Nevertheless, group comparisons have traditionally
used statistical procedures (e.g., 𝑡-tests) that assume that test
items function in a similar way for all participants regardless
of group membership [32]. This assumption of measurement
invariance (i.e., equivalent empirical relations in different
groups between test items and the latent construct) means
that group comparisons can yield spurious and misleading
results.
Recent advances in the measurement and analysis of
children’s understanding of mind are therefore useful in
strengthening the methodological rigor of cross-cultural
research. First, by testing the across-group equivalence of
the structure and scale of the latent construct, multiple-
groups confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) [34] provides
a statistical means of assessing measurement invariance.
Thus, our first aim was to assess whether commonly used
tests of children’s theory of mind exhibited measurement
invariance across three different cultures. To our knowledge,
this is the first cross-cultural study of children’s theory-
of-mind development to undertake a direct assessment of
measurement invariance.
In summary, our study had two primary aims. Our
first aim was to apply multiple-groups CFA to examine
whether a battery of theory-of-mind tasks would exhibit the
same measurement properties (i.e., equal form, equal factor
loadings, and equal factor variance) in children from UK,
Italy, and Japan. Our second aim was to test two competing
hypotheses. The first, based on the potential importance of
contrasts between Western and Confucian cultures, was that
both British and Italian children would outperform their
Japanese counterparts on the theory-of-mind task battery.
The second, based on the potential importance of pedagogical
experiences for children’s awareness of others’ minds, was
that children from UK, who enter school a year earlier than
children in either Italy or Japan, would outperform these two
groups (who would perform similarly to each other) on the
theory-of-mind task battery.
2. Method
2.1. Participants. Recruitment in UK, Italy, and Japan took
place via primary schools in three similarly historic cities:
Cambridge, Pavia, and Kyoto (the Universities of Cambridge
and Pavia were founded in 1209 and 1311 (resp.,) and Kyoto
was the capital of Japan from 794 to 1868). In size, Cam-
bridge and Pavia are similar in terms of both surface area
(115 km2 and 62 km2, resp.,) and population size (123,900
and 71,000, resp.,) but much smaller than Kyoto (828 km2,
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Table 1: Proportion of participants passing theory-of-mind tasks.
Indicator Total sample Gender differences National group differences
Males Females 𝜒2 UK Japan Italy 𝜒2
First-order false belief (nice surprise) .78 .78 .77 .05 .81 .84 .68 7.77
First-order false Belief (nasty surprise) .88 .87 .88 .05 .93 .85 .84 4.03
First-order false belief (chocolate) .70 .70 .70 .01 .89 .73 .49 34.80∗
First-order false belief (puppy) .56 .59 .54 .57 .88 .53 .28 66.32∗
Infer emotion from false belief (nice) .63 .65 .61 .63 .62 .65 .62 .17
Infer emotion from false belief (nasty) .71 .70 .71 .05 .78 .57 .77 11.86∗
Second-order false belief (chocolate) .34 .32 .35 .19 .43 .31 .27 6.09
Second-order false belief (puppy) .24 .26 .22 .62 .29 .22 .20 2.25
Note. ∗𝑃 < .0062 (Bonferroni adjustment to compensate for multiple tests).
population = 1.4 million). On average, residents in all three
cities are relatively prosperous: Cambridge residents have a
median annual income of $45,000 as compared with $29,040
for Pavia and $41,850.68 for Kyoto [35–37].
We initially recruited 118 children from UK, 106 children
from Japan and 123 children from Italy. We then matched
participants on the basis of age, gender, and performance on
a measure of receptive vocabulary.The final sample therefore
consisted of 268 children (UK: 𝑁 = 45 males, 45 females;
Japan: 43 males, 45 females; Italy: 45 males, 45 females), with
an average age of 6.05 years (SD = .29; UK: M Age = 6.03,
SD = .32; Japan: M Age = 6.06, SD = .30; Italy: M Age =
6.06, SD = .24). Note there were fewer males overall in the
original Japanese sample of 106 children and so we could
not obtain preciselymatched samples. Table 1 presents sample
characteristics and descriptive statistics for each national
group.
2.2. Procedures and Measures. Each of the study tasks was
translated into Italian and Japanese and then backtranslated
(by native speakers of each language who were also fluent in
English) in order to check the accuracy of these translations.
Most of the tasks used had been translated into Italian for a
previous study, and the actual wording (in both English and
Italian) is presented as an appendix in the paper by [38]. Tasks
were administered individually in a quiet room at school
by the authors and/or experienced and trained researchers,
using ethnically neutral props (e.g., toy animals, cartoon
drawings) and a Latin-square design to counterbalance the
order of presentation within the theory-of-mind task battery
and between this task battery and the verbal ability test. The
same puppets, story books, and materials were used in each
site.
2.2.1. Theory of Mind. We assessed children’s understanding
of mental states using four separate tasks which have previ-
ously shown good psychometric properties [3, 39].
The first two tasks were enacted using puppets and
featured stories about either a nice or a nasty surprise [29]. In
one story (“The Nasty Surprise”) a character (Leo the Lion)
received a nasty surprise when another character (Croc the
Crocodile) played a trick on him by substituting the contents
of a can of his favorite drink (cola) with a drink he disliked
(juice). In another story (“The Nice Surprise”) a character
received a nice surprise when another character (Freddie
the Frog) removed his least favorite snack (a pear) from his
lunchbox and replaced it with his favorite snack (an apple).
Previous research has shown that, for typically developing
children at least, performance on these two tasks is similar
and highly correlated [39].
In both stories, the examiners asked participants two
forced-choice comprehension questions to establish they
understood the characters’ desires (e.g., “How does Monty
feel when he gets a pear? Does he feel happy or not happy?”).
Next both stories contained a question that required children
to predict a character’s false belief about the contents of a
container (either the drink carton or the lunch box) (e.g.,
“What does Monty think is in the box, an apple or a
pear?”) and a forced-choice control question about the actual
contents of the container (e.g., “What is in the box really, an
apple or a pear?”). The participants were only credited with
passing the false-belief prediction question if they passed
both the test and control question.
Next, the examiners asked the participants to make an
emotion inference based upon both desire and belief infor-
mation [29]. Specifically, the examiners asked the participants
a forced-choice question about the character’s emotional state
about the contents of the container (either the lunch box or
the carton) before opening it (e.g., “How does he feel before
he looks in the box? Is he happy or not happy?”). Following
this, participants were asked an explanation question (e.g.,
“Why is he happy?”). In addition to these two questions,
participants were also required to pass two further compre-
hension questions about the character’s emotional state after
learning the actual contents of the container. Participants
were only credited with being able to infer a character’s
emotions based on beliefs and desires if they passed both
(a) the relevant false-belief prediction question and (b) the
comprehension questions about the character’s emotional
state after learning the true contents of the container. We
derived two separate scores from participants’ performance
on each task: (a) the ability to predict a first-order false belief
(0-1) and (b) the ability to infer and explain a character’s
emotion based on his/her false-beliefs (0-1).Thus, from these
two stories we created four separate indicators: First-Order
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False Belief (Nice Surprise), First-Order False Belief (Nasty
Surprise), Infer Emotion from False Belief (Nice Surprise),
and Infer Emotion from False Belief (Nasty Surprise).
The remaining two tasks featured picture book stories
designed to measure children’s understanding of second-
order false beliefs [40]. In the first story (“The Puppy Story”),
Peter’s mother buys him a puppy for his birthday and wants
to surprise him. To do so, she tells Peter that she will not
get him a puppy. Unbeknown to Peter’s mother, he discovers
the puppy while looking for his bicycle in the shed. In this
task, participants first had to answer a forced-choice question
about Peter’s initial false belief about his birthday present
(“What did Peter think he was getting for his birthday?”) and
a corresponding question aboutwhat Peter is really getting for
his birthday (“Whatwas hismother giving him really?”). Four
further questions were asked to assess second-order false-
belief understanding, that is, the ability to make inferences
about a character’s beliefs about another character’s beliefs
[41]. In the story, Peter’s grandmother telephones his mother
and asks her what Peter thinks he is getting for his birthday.
Children were asked two further test questions (“What does
Mum say to Granny?” and “Why did she say that?”) as well as
two further control questions (“Did Mum see Peter finding
the present?” and “What has Mum really got Peter for his
birthday?”).
In the second story (“The Chocolate Story”), Mary and
John are given some chocolate to share. John hides the
chocolate in a tin but lies to Mary about its location telling
her it is in the refrigerator. Later, unbeknown to John, Mary
sees him taking some of the chocolate out of the tin. As
in the previous story, the examiners asked participants to
answer a forced-choice question about Mary’s initial false
belief about the location of the chocolate (“Where does Mary
think the chocolate is?”) and a corresponding question about
the actual location of the chocolate (“Where did John put
the chocolate really?”). After Mary and John have finished
playing, their mother tells Mary that she can come in to get
the chocolate. Participants were then asked a second-order
false-belief attribution question (“Where does John think
that Mary will look for the chocolate?”) and an explanation
question (“Why does he think that?”). These questions were
followed by two further control questions to assess children’s
comprehension of the story (“Did John see Mary looking
through the kitchen window?” and “Where did John put the
chocolate really?”).
From each of these two stories, we derived two separate
scores: (a) the ability to predict a character’s first-order
false belief (0-1) and (b) the ability to infer and explain a
character’s second-order false belief (0-1). Participants were
only credited with correctly passing the first-order false-
belief question if they passed both the test question and
reality control question. Participants were only credited with
passing the second-order false-belief question if they passed
both the inference and explanation questions as well as the
two comprehension questions. Thus across these two stories,
we obtained four further binary indictors: First-Order False
Belief (Chocolate Story), First-Order False Belief (Puppy
Story), Second-Order False Belief (Chocolate Story), and
Second-Order False Belief (Puppy Story).
2.2.2. Verbal Ability. Verbal ability (VA) was measured using
the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence
(WPPSI-III) receptive vocabulary test [42] or a language-
appropriate translation [43, 44]. Participants were required
to point to one of four pictures that matched a word read
aloud by the examiner. Testing was discontinued after five
consecutive incorrect responses. The total number of correct
items were summed together to create a score for each
participant giving a possible range of 0 to 38.
3. Results
National groups did not differ by age, 𝐹(2, 265) = .27, 𝑃 =
.76, or gender, 𝜒2(2) = .03, 𝑃 = .99, or receptive vocabulary
scores, 𝐹(2, 265) = .89, 𝑃 = .89. The mean receptive vocab-
ulary score was 29.19, SD = 3.21 (UK: M = 29.47, SD = 3.58,
Japan:M=29.27, SD=2.96, Italy:M=28.84, SD= 3.05).There
were no gender differences in age, 𝑡(266) = .65, 𝑃 = .52, or
receptive vocabulary scores, 𝑡(266) = .45, 𝑃 = .65.
During the matching procedure we excluded those chil-
dren with missing data on key matching variables (i.e.,
age, gender, and receptive vocabulary). We did not exclude
children who failed control questions on the theory-of-mind
tasks. Instead, children who failed the control questions were
allotted a score of zero on the corresponding test question.
Table 1 shows the proportion of children passing each of the
theory-of-mind indicators within the total sample, the male
sample, the female sample, and each national group. Table 2
shows tetrachoric correlations between individual indicators
(these describe the relations between two dichotomous vari-
ables when it is assumed that a continuous latent variable
underpins test performance [45]). As Table 1 shows, there
were no gender differences for any of the theory-of-mind task
indicators.
3.1. Analytic Strategy. We used MPlus Version 6 [46] to
examine the latent factor structure of the 8 binary (pass/fail)
indicators of theory of mind. Given the categorical nature of
the data, we used a mean- and variance-adjusted weighted
least squares estimator (WLSMV) [34, 47]. This approach
assumes that performance on dichotomous categorical indi-
cators is related to a continuous and normally distributed
underlying ability.That is, a certain amount of the underlying
trait or ability is needed to pass the threshold on each
indicator (e.g., from fail to pass) ([34]; Kline, 2011). Thus
estimates are based on the tetrachoric correlation matrix
for the binary indicators. We evaluated model fit using two
recommended criteria: comparative fit index (CFI) >.90 and
tucker lewis index (TLI) >.90 (e.g., [34]). The difference in
fit between nonnested models was assessed using the Akaike
information criterion (AIC) with preference given to the
model with the lowest AIC value [34]. Since the difference
in 𝜒2 values for nested models estimated usingWLSMV does
not adhere to the standard𝜒2 distribution, the difference in fit
between nestedmodels was evaluated using a special formula
for the 𝜒2 difference test available in MPlus [34].
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Table 2: Tetrachoric correlation matrix for theory-of-mind indicators.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
(1) First-order false Belief (nice surprise) —
(2) First-order false belief (nasty surprise) .70 —
(3) First-order false belief (chocolate) .66 .51 —
(4) First-order false belief (puppy) .53 .61 .71 —
(5) Infer emotion from false belief (nice) .91 .69 .58 .43 —
(6) Infer emotion from false belief (nasty) .35 .70 .22 .33 .35 —
(7) Second-order false belief (chocolate) .57 .65 .88 .57 .55 .32 —
(8) Second-order false belief (puppy) .54 .55 .64 .87 .56 .28 .70 —
Note: all values are significant, 𝑃 < .001.
3.1.1. Modelling Individual Differences in Theory of Mind.
Our first step was to compare the fit of three competing
hypothetical models of the structure of individual differences
in theory of mind in the sample as a whole. In the first
model, we specified a one-factor solution in which each of
the 8 binary indicators loaded onto a single latent theory-
of-mind factor. All but one of the fit indices suggested that
the model provided an adequate fit to the data, 𝜒2(20) =
105.89, 𝑃 < .0001, CFI = .94, TLI = .92. Modification
indices highlighted that the model fit could be improved by
permitting measurement error terms to be correlated for the
Predict First-Order False Belief indicator and corresponding
Infer Emotion based on False Belief indicator for both
the Nice Surprise and Nasty Surprise stories. Correlated
measurement error arises when two test indicators are related
by both the common latent factor and other sources such
as shared methods of administration [34]. We adjusted the
model accordingly given that the Predict First Order False
Belief and Infer Emotion based on False Belief indicators
arose from the same task. This modified model provided a
good fit to the data, 𝜒2(18) = 42.06, 𝑃 = .001, CFI = .98,
TLI = .98, AIC = 6.06.
Next we specified an alternative model with two cor-
related latent factors. The first latent factor was comprised
of six indicators: four first-order false-belief indicators and
two second-order false-belief indicators. The second latent
factor consisted of the two emotion-inference indicators.
We permitted the measurement terms for the Predict First-
Order False Belief and Infer Emotion based on False Belief to
correlate within the Nice Surprise and Nasty Surprise stories.
This model provided a good fit to the data, 𝜒2(17) = 40.83,
𝑃 = .001, CFI = .98, TLI = .98, AIC = 6.83.
In the third and final model, we specified a three-factor
solution. The first latent factor consisted of four first-order
false-belief indicators, the second consisted of two second-
order false-belief indicators, and the third consisted of two
emotion-inference based on false belief indicators. These
three latent factors were permitted to correlate. Consistent
with the previous two models, we correlated the measure-
ment error terms for the Predict First-Order False Belief
and the corresponding Infer Emotion based on False Belief
indicator for the Nice Surprise and Nasty Surprise stories.
This third model provided an adequate fit to the data,
𝜒
2
(15) = 41.25, 𝑃 = .001, CFI = .98, TLI = .97, AIC = 11.25.
We selected the first model (the one-factor solution) over
the second and third model as this model provided the
most parsimonious solution to the data.Thismodel exhibited
the lowest AIC value and was theoretically the most simple
model.The theory-of-mind latent factor explained significant
variance in performance on the 8 indicators, unstandardized
estimate = 0.56, 𝑃 < .001. Table 3 presents the standardised
item loadings for the theory-of-mind latent factor.
3.2. Modelling Theory-of-Mind Performance across Nations.
Prior to examining mean performance on the latent theory-
of-mind factor in each national group, we used multiple-
groups CFA to examine whether the single latent factor
solution exhibited measurement invariance across the three
groups. We replicated the single latent-factor solution hold-
ing the form, factor loadings, and indicator thresholds equal
across all three groups. With the exception of one fit index,
thismodel exhibited adequate fit,𝜒2(66) = 115.14,𝑃 = .0002,
CFI = .97, TLI = .97. Inspection of the modification indices
showed that one indicator was noninvariant, specifically the
Predict First-Order False Belief item from the Peter and the
Puppy Story. That is, there was a difference in performance
on this particular indicator that was unrelated to children’s
underlying theory-of-mind abilities. The identification of a
noninvariant item does not preclude further measurement
invariance testing [48]. Amodel is said to exhibit partialmea-
surement invariance if a selection of items are noninvariant
[48, 49]. Some researchers may opt to eliminate noninvari-
ant items. However, this practice can result in incomplete
coverage of the construct or the creation of different scales
for different groups [33].The partial measurement invariance
approach, inwhich invariant items are constrained to equality
across groups and noninvariant items are free to vary across
groups, reduces bias in the model and uses all the data
available [33, 34]. This method permits the examination
of latent factor mean differences even in the presence of
noninvariant items [34].
We therefore freely estimated the thresholds for the
noninvariant indicator in UK and Italy. That is, while all
other factor loadings and thresholds were constrained, the
Predict First-Order False Belief item from the Peter and the
Puppy Story was released. The resulting model provided a
good fit to the data, 𝜒2(64) = 91.51, 𝑃 = .01, CFI = .99,
TLI = .98. This suggests that the single theory-of-mind latent
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Table 3: Standardized WLSMV estimates of factor loadings for the theory-of-mind latent factor.
Total Sample Multiple-groups CFA
UK Japan Italy
First-order false belief (nice surprise) .75 .65 .92 .75
First-order false belief (nasty surprise) .81 .69 .86 .78
First-order false belief (chocolate) .82 .98 .76 .86
First-order false belief (puppy) .84 .71 .82 .97
Infer emotion from false belief (nice) .68 .63 .92 .65
Infer emotion from false belief (nasty) .39 .44 .25+ .61
Second-order false belief (chocolate) .78 .75 .75 .87
Second-order false belief (puppy) .89 .89 .79 .93
Note: +𝑃 < .01. All other loadings are significant, 𝑃 < .001.
Table 4: Standardized WLSMV estimates for correlations between
theory of mind, age and verbal ability in UK, Japan, and Italy.
UK Japan Italy
Age .38∗ .46∗ .13
Verbal .66∗ .65∗ .47∗
Note: ∗𝑃 < .001.
factor exhibited partial measurement invariance [48]. With
the exception of one indicator, the theory-of-mind latent
factor exhibited equal form, equal factor loadings, and equal
thresholds. Table 4 shows the standardized theory-of-mind
factor loadings for each nation for the partial measurement
invariance model.
3.3. Group Differences in Children’s Theory of Mind. Our next
aim was to examine group differences in performance on
the latent theory-of-mind factor. To ensure that potential
group differences in latent factor means were interpretable,
we constrained the variance of the latent factor to be equal
(0.42) across each of the national groups, 𝜒2(66) = 92.81,
𝑃 = .02, CFI = .99, TLI = .98, AIC = 6.06. This additional
constraint did not result in a significant degradation ofmodel
fit, Δ𝜒2(2) = 2.88, 𝑃 = .24. To test overall group differences
in the theory-of-mind latent factor, we further constrained
the means to be equal across national groups.This constraint
decreased the model fit from the unconstrained solution,
𝜒
2
(68) = 112.53, 𝑃 = .0006, CFI = .97, TLI = .97, Δ𝜒2(2) =
10.85, 𝑃 = .004, indicating a significant mean contrast
between national groups on the latent theory-of-mind factor.
To explore this contrast further, we fixed the mean of the
UK theory-of-mind latent factor to zero so that the mean
of the other two groups represented deviations from the
latentmean of British children.Whenwe appliedBonferroni’s
adjustment to compensate for multiple comparisons (𝛼 =
.02) we found that children in UK performed significantly
better than children in Italy, 0.61 SD, 𝑃 = .002 andmarginally
better than children in Japan, 0.41 SD,𝑃 = .02. Next, fixing the
mean of the latent factor for Japanese children to zero so that
the mean for the Italian children represented the difference,
we found no significant mean difference in performance for
children in Japan and Italy, 0.20 SD, 𝑃 = .29. In summary,
even when the noninvariance in one item was accounted for,
children from the UK outperformed children from the other
two countries, with a medium to large effect for the contrast
with Italy and a small to medium effect for the contrast with
Japan [50].
3.4. Theory of Mind, Age, and Receptive Vocabulary across
Groups. Indicators of receptive vocabulary and age were
entered into the partial measurement invariance multiple-
groups solution and allowed to covary with the theory-of-
mind latent factor. This model provided an adequate fit to
the data, 𝜒2(108) = 148.18, 𝑃 = .01, CFI = .98, TLI =
.98. From Table 4, which presents the correlations between
the theory-of-mind latent factor score and both receptive
vocabulary and age by country, it can be seen that there
were moderate correlations between age and theory of mind
in UK and Japan but not in Italy and strong correlations
between receptive vocabulary and theory of mind in UK and
Japan but only moderate links between receptive vocabulary
and theory of mind in Italy. To test whether the strength
of the correlations between the theory-of-mind latent factor,
receptive vocabulary, and age was significantly different in
each nation, we constrained the correlations between these
variables to equality. The model fit degraded significantly
against the baseline (unconstrained) solution, 𝜒2(114) =
195.64, 𝑃 = .00001, CFI = .96, TLI = .95, Δ𝜒2(6) = 27.30,
𝑃 = .0001. Thus, there were significant differences in the
strength of the association between individual differences in
performance on the theory-of-mind latent factor and age and
receptive vocabulary across the three nations.
The baseline (unconstrained) solution revealed signifi-
cant across group differences in performance on the theory-
of-mind latent factor, even when effects of individual dif-
ferences in age and receptive vocabulary were controlled.
Again, we applied Bonferroni’s adjustment to compensate
for multiple comparisons (𝛼 = .02). Both Japanese and
Italian children performed worse than children fromUK: the
average difference was 0.43 SD, 𝑃 = .02, for Japanese children
and 0.62 SD, 𝑃 = .001 for Italian children. There was no
significant difference between Japanese and Italian children,
0.19 SD,𝑃 = .29. In summary, with effects of age and receptive
vocabulary controlled, the group differences remained largely
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the same: children from UK outperformed children from the
other two countries, with a large effect for the contrast with
Italy and a medium effect for the contrast with Japan [51].
4. Discussion
This study compared theory-of-mind task performance in
6-year olds (matched for age, gender, and verbal ability)
living in three small but historic cities in UK, Japan, and
Italy (Cambridge, Pavia, and Kyoto). Our first aim was to
ensure that group comparisons were valid and meaning-
ful; to this end we applied CFAs to establish across-cul-
ture measurement invariance. Our second aim was to test
two competing hypotheses regarding mean theory-of-mind
scores for children from each of these three countries. The
first “general culture” hypothesis was that children in the
two Western countries (UK and Italy) would outperform
children growing up in a collectivistic culture in Japan on
tests tapping the awareness of the subjective nature of mental
states. The second “pedagogical experience” hypothesis was
that children in the UK (who begin school a year earlier
than children in Italy or Japan) would outperform the other
two groups on the theory-of-mind task battery. Our results
supported this second hypothesis, with group differences
remaining significant even when effects of verbal ability were
controlled.
4.1. Do Theory-of-Mind Tasks Show Measurement Invariance
across Cultures? We found that a parsimonious solution in
which each theory-of-mind indicator loaded onto a single
theory-of-mind factor provided the best fit to our data sug-
gesting that performance on each indicator was underpinned
by individual differences in mental-state reasoning. It is
possible that each of the theory-of-mind indicators loaded
onto this latent factor for theoretically less interesting reasons.
For example, the theory-of-mind indicators may have been
related to a single latent factor because of shared demands
on children’s story comprehension or general language skills.
Against these more trivial accounts, it is worth noting
that while the data supported a single factor solution, the
loadings were weaker for the items regarding inference of
emotion based on false belief. To establish divergent validity
more fully, future research using CFA to measure individual
differences in theory of mind would benefit from including
items that match the structure of the theory-of-mind tasks
but do not involve reasoning about mental states. Such items
would not be expected to load significantly on a latent theory-
of-mind factor. While the current study did not include such
items, we were able to conduct a subsequent analysis with a
single factor model for the whole sample in which each of
the theory-of-mind indicators loaded onto the single latent
factor and was regressed onto receptive vocabulary scores.
The resulting model provided a good fit to the data, 𝜒2(18) =
44.99, 𝑃 = .0008, CFI = .98, TLI = .96, RMSEA = .07.
The latent theory-of-mind factor variance was significant,
unstandardized estimate = 0.43, 𝑃 < .001, and the mean
factor loading was .61, Range: .30–.79, all 𝑃 < .01. Thus,
individual differences in verbal ability could not fully explain
the links between these items.
Perhaps more important than assessing the fit of a mea-
surement model, CFA also allows one to minimize spurious
results by examining whether a model shows measurement
invariance across different groups. Until very recently, cross-
cultural psychological studies have paid remarkably little
attention to issues ofmeasurement invariance [33]. For exam-
ple, this study is the first cross-cultural comparison of theory
of mind to examine this assumption directly. Our single
factor solution showed partial measurement invariance [48],
in that 7 of the 8 task indicators exhibited invariance across
each of the three cultural groups. Rather than removing this
item or ignoring the item’s noninvariance, multiple-groups
CFA permitted us to release the equality constraints on this
item before comparing group means. This approach is less
likely than traditional methods (e.g., ANOVA) to introduce
bias into estimates of group means [33, 48]. As the partial
measurement invariance solution was sufficient to assess
group contrasts, we can infer that the majority of theory-of-
mind tasks used in our study measured the same construct in
the same way in very different cultural settings. In short, the
results from our multiple-groups CFA are reassuring in that
they indicate that the meaning of these widely used tests is
not “lost in translation.’’
The exceptional item asked children what a character
(mistakenly) thought he was getting for his birthday. This
item showed differential item functioning (DIF) in that
different scores were obtained by children from each of
the national groups who actually had the same level of
underlying latent theory-of-mind ability [34]. Specifically,
while participants in UK found this item easier than would
be expected on the basis of their latent theory-of-mind factor
scores, participants in the Italian group found this itemmore
difficult than would be expected. Here, it is worth noting
that when administering this task to Italian children, one
author (SL) observed that children often objected to this
story, arguing that “mums do not tell lies to their children”
or “mums always tell the truth.”These comments suggest that
the Italian children may have performed particularly poorly
on this task because they found the narrative implausible. To
elucidate the origins of this differential item functioning, the
relationship between actor and partner in the stories and the
motivation for deception, could be varied systematically in
future studies in order to establish whether group differences
in task performance reflect deontic cultural contrasts in either
of these specific elements.
4.2. Explaining Similarities and Contrasts across Cultures. It
is remarkable that despite the difference in analytical ap-
proach and sample age (our study included 5- to 6-year
olds, whereas previous studies have involved younger chil-
dren), our findings echo those from previous studies [18,
38]. Note also, that in contrast with previous studies, this
investigation included comparisons bothwithin theWest and
between East and West. This feature of the study allowed
us to pit two competing hypotheses against each other. In
the former “general culture” hypothesis, group differences
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were expected between East and West, with children from
collectivistic cultures (such as Japan) showing less advanced
understanding of the subjective nature of mental states than
children from individualistic Western cultures (such as Italy
andUK). In the second “pedagogical experiences” hypothesis
originally proposed by [38], the advantage in theory-of-mind
performance was predicted to be specific to children from
UK, who begin school a year before children in Italy or
Japan. Consistent with this second hypothesis, we found that
the children from UK outperformed both the Japanese and
Italian children and that there were no significant differences
between the latter two groups.
While the contrast in children’s pedagogical experiences
provides a simple and plausible account of the group differ-
ences obtained in this study, it is important to acknowledge
that we did not have access to information about individual
children’s families, such that several family-focused accounts
of cultural difference also deserve consideration. For exam-
ple, within-culture studies indicate that individual differ-
ences in children’s false-belief understanding show robust
associations with variation in the quality of mother-child
relationships [52] and in patterns of mother-child talk [10].
Cross-cultural studies indicate that, in comparison with
American (and by inference British)mothers, Italianmothers
favor social-oriented interactions [53], adopt a parenting
style centered on intimacy, physical affection, and emotional
availability [54, 55]. While these contrasts would all appear
to favor Italian children, the results from two other studies
suggest a different picture. Specifically, Tardif et al. [56] found
that Italian mothers talked less often with their toddlers but
asked more “test” questions (e.g., “What animal is that?”)
than British mothers, who asked more genuine questions
(e.g., “What would you like to do?”). This contrast in the
proportion of genuine questions is interesting and indicates
that Britishmothers show a greater tendency to consider their
children as thinking individuals (i.e., as autonomous agents).
Consistent with this view, recent cross-cultural work on the
social origins of childhood anxiety has demonstrated that
Italian mothers are more intrusive and controlling and less
autonomy granting than British mothers [57].
Finally, while we did not have access to information about
family size for our study participants, it is worth noting that
the three countries in this study also differ in mean number
of children per family. Recent data released by the OECD
[58] indicates that, among children aged 0–14 years, the
percentage of children with one ormore sibling is 78% inUK,
75% in Italy, and 72% in Japan (with corresponding fertility
rates of 1.94, 1.41 and 1.37). In Western samples, the presence
of siblings, especially older siblings, has been found to predict
false-belief performance (e.g., [59]). Interestingly, however,
this facilitative effect of siblings is not evident among Japanese
children [12], and for Chinese children (who typically do
not have siblings), contact with cousins (i.e., with other
children in the family) appears negatively related to false-
belief performance [60]. This contrast may reflect cultural
differences in the nature of child-child relationships, as older
children in collectivist cultures are strongly encouraged to
take on a caregiving role and so may not be as playful in
their interactions as children in more individualistic cultures
[61]. Such qualitative contrasts in the nature of the sibling
relationship in different cultures are likely to be important, as
other studies have shown that, for preschoolers, the advantage
of having an older sibling is restricted to siblings aged
under 12 who, one might presume, are more likely to act as
playmates for preschooler than are older children [59, 62].
At this point it is worth noting that although East-West
contrasts in executive function have received considerable
attention from researchers (e.g., [22]), a recent meta-analysis
of data from 10,000 children from 15 different countries has
shown no geographical contrasts in the association between
false-belief performance and executive function [63]. More-
over, as noted by Liu et al. [18], a myriad of factors are
likely to contribute to cultural contrasts in performance (e.g.,
exposure to formal schooling, quality, and content of family
interactions). Future research is needed to test more complex
accounts of between-country contrasts. For example, expo-
sure to formal schooling with the associated requirements for
children to regulate their behaviour and attend to instructions
may accelerate the maturation of executive functions and so
indirectly enhance children’s growing awareness of mental
states.
4.3. Conclusions and Caveats. We propose that the findings
from this study contribute to the literature bothmethodolog-
ically and conceptually. At a methodological level, the careful
matching of samples for verbal ability (as well as age and
gender) made this study more rigorous than many previous
studies of cultural differences in children’s acquisition of a
concept of mind. In addition, by adopting a latent variable
approach we were able to conduct multigroup CFAs in order
to test directly whether spurious measurement effects were
likely to have contributed to cultural contrasts reported in
previous studies. In each of these respects, our findings were
reassuring. Even though the groups were more carefully
matched, our results were strikingly similar to those reported
in previous studies; moreover, the latent factors obtained in
each country showed a similar structure, with similar factor
loadings and similar factor variance.
Demonstrating the similarities in factor structure, load-
ing, and variance also has conceptual implications. Specif-
ically, our results indicate that between-country contrasts
reported in previous studies are unlikely to be a spurious
artefact of measurement effects as, of the 8 items used,
just one was noninvariant and this item had not been used
in previous comparisons of samples from the East and
West. That said, although latent mean comparisons can be
carried out even when some items are noninvariant [48], our
findings can only be viewed as a first step towards elucidating
cultural differences in children’s theory ofmind. In particular,
although our finding of measurement equivalence addresses
concerns about the validity of applying measures of theory
of mind in different languages with different cultures, there
remains much work to be done in addressing other concerns
about cross-cultural comparisons (e.g., whether variation in
task performance has the same origins and consequences for
children from different countries).
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Another key conceptual finding was that the East-West
contrast was restricted to children in UK, with the largest
group difference being observed between children in UK
and children in Italy. Thus, our findings challenge the
“general culture” hypothesis and suggest that specific expe-
riences (perhaps particularly children’s experiences of formal
schooling) may have greater impact on children’s developing
understanding of mental states. However, a key limitation of
the current study was the lack of direct information about
children’s conversations and relationships both within and
outside the family. Two important goals for future research
in this field are (i) recruiting samples that enable more
refined comparisons (e.g., from cultures that speak the same
language but differ in the age at which children begin formal
schooling) and (ii) direct assessing aspects of children’s social
environments (both at home and at school) in order to
locate more precisely the factors that contribute to between-
country differences in the rate at which children acquire an
understanding of their own and others’ minds.
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